

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 VIENNA 1825

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E. O. 11652 GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: AD HOC MEETING OF 27 FEBRUARY, 1974

BEGIN SUMMARY: THE AHG MEETING OF 27 FEBRUARY 1974 WAS CHAIRED BY NETHERLANDS REP (QUALRES). DISCUSSION WAS DEVOTED MAINLY TO A DETAILED REVIEW AND APPROVAL OF THE PROPOSED TALKING POINTS FOR USE IN THE INFORMAL DISCUSSION WITH THE EAST SCHEDULED FOR THE AFTERNOON OF 27 FEBRUARY. THE AHG REVIEWED AND APPROVED THE DRAFT STATEMENT ON STABILIZING MEASURES SCHEDULED TO BE GIVEN BY THE CANADIAN REP AT THE PLENARY ON 28 FEBRUARY. END SUMMARY.

TALKING POINTS FOR THE 27 FEBRUARY INFORMAL MEETING WITH THE EAST

1. CHAIRMAN (NETHERLANDS REP) ASKED IF THERE WERE ANY BILATERALS TO REPORT. THERE BEING NON, DISCUSSION BEGAN ON THE SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS THAT THE US DELEGATION HAD PREPARED FOR

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THE 27 FEBRUARY INFORMAL MEETING WITH THE EAST. UK REP (ROSE)

SAID THAT HE WOULD HAVE DETAILED COMMENTS LATER BUT THAT HE WISHED TO BEGIN WITH THREE FUNDAMENTAL POINTS. FIRST, THE TESIS PUT FORWARD RELIED ENTIRELY ON COMPARISONS BETWEEN THE WEST'S FIRST PHASE AND ALL OF THE EASTERN PHASES. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS WAS DONE TO ENABLE A NUMERICAL COMPARISON BETWEEN THE TWO PROPOSALS, BUT HE FELT IT WOULD BE DANGEROUS TO GIVE THE EAST THE IMPRESSION THAT THE TOTAL WESTERN PROPOSAL WOULD ONLY BE SEEKING THE REDUCTION OF 78,000 SOVIET PERSONNEL. PHASE II SHOULD BRING MORE SOVIET REDUCTIONS AND THESE SHOULD NOT BE JEOPARDIZED BY WESTERN FORMULATIONS USED NOW. HIS SECOND POINT WAS THAT THE ARGUMENTS FORM THE PREVIOUS PLENARY STATEMENTS ABOUT WHY PHASE I REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE LIMITED TO US/SOVIET FORCES WERE NOT INCLUDED IN THE TALKING POINTS. WHILE HE REALIZED THAT IT WAS DESIRABLE TO GET THESE INFORMAL SESSIONS AWAY FROM UNPRODUCTIVE ARGUMENTATION, HE FELT THAT THESE WERE STRONG ARGUMENTS FOR THE WESTERN POSITION; IF THEY WERE OMITTED, AHG REPS WOULD NOT LEARN WHAT THE EASTERN REACTION WAS TO THEM. UK REP'S FINAL COMMENT WAS THAT PHASING SHOULD BE MENTIONED IN THE TALKING POINTS. THIS WOULD TAKE CARE OF HIS FIRST POINT AND WOULD ALLOW REFERENCE TO BE MADE TO THE COMMON CEILING WHICH IS THE WEST'S EVENTUAL AIM.

2. THE CHAIRMAN SAID THAT HE WAS GLAD UK REP HAD MADE THE FIRST POINT ABOUT THE DIFFICULTIES OF COMPARING THE WHOLE EASTERN PROPOSAL WITH PHASE I WITH THE WESTERN PROPOSAL; HE HAD INTENDED TO MAKE A SIMILAR COMMENT. ITALIAN DEP REP (TALIANI) SAID THAT HE WISHED TO MAKE A POINT SIMILAR TO THAT MDE BY THE UK REP. HE FELT THAT PHASE I SHOULD BE MENTIONED IN THE TALKING POINTS, BUT THE ALLIED REPS SHOULD NOT MAKE IT OBVIOUS THAT SOVIET REDUCTIONS WILL ALSO BE SOUGHT IN PHASE 2. SUCH A STATEMENT WOULD NOT BE WISE, AND IT WOULD BE OUTSIDE THE AHG'S TERMS OF REFERENCE. INCLUDING SOME ADDITIONAL REFERENCES TO PHASE I IN THE TALKING POINTS WOULD AVOID THE QUESTIONS BEING TURNED AGAINST THE ALLIES DURING PHASE 2 NEGOTIATIONS AS ARGUMENTS AGAINST FUTURE SOVIET REDUCTIONS.

3. US REP SAID THAT HE AGREED WITH THE SUGGESTION THAT FACT THAT TANK ARMY REDUCTION WAS ALLIED PHASE 1 PROPOSAL SHOULD BE MENTIONED MORE SPECIFICALLY. REFERRING TO UK REP'S SECOND POINT, US REP SAID THAT THE ARGUMENTS FOR LIMITING REDUCTIONS

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TO US AND SOVIET FORCES HAD BEEN INTENTIONALLY OMITTED. THE INTENTION WAS TO SAVE THOSE ARGUMENTS FOR REBUTTAL OR FOR LATER SESSIONS ON THE FORCES OF OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO JUSTIFY PHASING. IF THOSE ARGUMENTS WERE RAISED NOW, THIS COULD ENCOURAGE THE EASTERN REPS TO DISCUSS NATIONAL FORCES DURING THE FIRST SESSION ON US AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS.

4. FRG REP (BEHREND) SAID THAT HE SUPPORTED THE UK REP'S

POINT THAT IT WOULD BE WRONG TO IMPLY THAT THE TOTAL WESTERN PROPOSAL WAS MORE MODEST THAN THE EASTERN PROPOSAL OR THAT THE TANK ARMY WOULD BE THE ONLY SOVIET REDUCTION THAT THE WEST WOULD SEEK; THESE ARE NOT COMPARABLE TOTALITIES. BUT HE ALSO FELT THAT IT WOULD NOT BE PRODUCTIVE TO GO INTO THE SUBJECT OF EASTERN PHASE 2 REDUCTIONS. CHAIRMAN ADDED THAT THE PROPOSALS DID NOT SEEM TO BE AS SIMILAR IF PHASE 2 WAS ALSO CONSIDERED. US REP RESPONDED THAT THIS FACT BECAME CLEAR WHEN IT WAS REALIZED THAT THE WEST WAS ASKING FOR 225,000 MEN FROM THE PACT.

5. UK REP AGREED WITH THE US DESIRE TO LIMIT ARGUMENTS TO THE SIMILARITY OF THE TWO PROPOSALS ON US/SOVIET

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GROUND FORCES, AND HE AGREED THAT IT MIGHT NOT BE WISE TO USE ALL GENERAL ARGUMENTS FOR LIMITING PHASE 1 REDUCTIONS TO US AND SOVIET FORCES FROM THE OUTSET. HOWEVER, HE FELT THAT ALLIED REPS SHOULD BE READY WITH REBUTTAL NOTES FROM THE PLENARY STATEMENTS. IF QUESTIONS THEN ARISE, AHG REPS SHOULD TRY TO ENGAGE EASTERN REPS FORCEFULLY WITH THE STRONG WESTERN ARGUMENTS.

US REP ANSWERED THAT THE INTENTION OF THE TALKING POINTS WAS NOT TO IGNORE GENERAL ARGUMENTS FOR THE WESTERN POSITION. BUT THE MAIN PURPOSE OF INFORMAL MEETINGS IS TO DRAW THE EAST OUT AND TO BEGIN A DIALOGUE ON THE SPECIFICS OF THE WESTERN PROPOSAL. THIS WAS MORE LIKELY TO HAPPEN IF WESTERN REPS APPEARED TO BE SPEAKING TO THIS SUBJECT RATHER THAN REPEATING GENERAL PLENARY STATEMENTS. CHAIRMAN ADDED THAT UNDER THE LIMITED PROCEDURAL UNDERSTANDING, ALLIED REPS WERE TRYING TO DESCRIBE WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF THEIR PROPOSAL WERE ACCEPTED; THEY WERE NOT NECESSARILY AT THIS POINT TRYING TO TALK THE EAST INTO ACCEPTING THE PROPOSAL ON THE SPOT. THE EAST SHOULD BE GIVEN TO UNDERSTAND THAT IF ANY POINTS WERE NOT MENTIONED IN INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS, THEY WOULD

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NOT MEAN THAT THE WEST FELT THAT THEY WERE NOT LONGER VALID.

6. A PROLONGED DISCUSSION OF THE DETAILS OF THE TALKING POINTS ENSURED WHICH FOCUSED ON THE ISSUES NOTED ABOVE.

7. FRG REP SAID IT WOULD BE WRONG TO SAY THAT THE TWO PROPOSALS ARE CLOSE WHEN THE WEST ASKES FOR 1,700 SOVIET TANKS IN RETURN FOR NO US TANKS; SUCH A REFERENCE MIGHT ENCOURAGE THE EAST TO ASK FOR US TANK REDUCTIONS. US DEP REP RESPONDED THAT THE IMMEDIATE WESTERN OBJECTIVE WOULD BE ACHIEVED IF DISCUSSION GOT ONTO A PRACTICAL PLANE.

8. US REP EXPLAINED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THE SITUATION THAT WOULD RESULT FROM THE REDUCTION OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY WITHOUT ANY CORRESPONDING US REDUCTION, AND THE SITUATION THAT WOULD RESULT IF THE TANK ARMY WERE WITHDRAWN IN CONNECTION WITH US REDUCTIONS. IT WOULD NOT BE PRODUCTIVE TO ARGUE THAT EASTERN SECURITY WOULD REMAIN THE SAME IF A TANK ARMY WERE REDUCED ALONE. THE WESTERN CASE IS MORE PERSUASIVE IF THE 29,000 MAN US REDUCTION IS CONSIDERED TOGETHER WITH THE REDUCTION OF A TANK ARMY.

9. CHAIRMAN SAID THAT THE EAST MIGHT ARGUE THAT IT WOULD BE EASIER FOR THE US TO RETURN ITS REDUCED INDIVIDUALS TO THE AREA THAN FOR THE SOVIETS TO RETURN THEIR REDUCED UNITS. HE NOTED THAT THE WESTERN STABILIZATION MEASURE WHICH WOULD LIMIT THE RE-INTRODUCTION OF INDIVIDUAL PERSONNEL INTO THE AREA TO 5,000 AT ANY GIVEN TIME WOULD TAKE AWAY ANY POSSIBLE UNFAIRNESS.

10. US DEP REP SAID THAT THIS WOULD BE A GOOD REBUTTAL ARGUMENT IF THE EAST SAID IT WAS UNFAIR FOR IT TO BE REQUIRED TO REDUCE UNITS WHILE THE US WAS ABLE TO STRUCTURE ITS OWN REDUCTION.

11. UK REP MENTIONED ARGUMENT MADE BY SOVIET DEP REP (SMIRNOWSKY) THAT THE NEARNESS OF THE SOVIET UNION TO THE REDUCTION AREA MADE

IT MORE IMPORTANT FOR THEM TO HAVE A LARGER FORCE IN THE AREA THAN THE US. UK REP FELT THAT THE TALKING POINTS SHOULD NOT NECESSARILY INCLUDE ANY MENTION OF THIS CONCEPT, BUT WESTERN REPS SHOULD BE READY TO ANSWER THE QUESTION. HE ARGUED THAT THE PROPER ANSWER TO THE QUESTION WOULD BE THAT SOVIET FORCES

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IN THE AREA ARE OF CONCERN TO ALL OF THE WESTERN ALLIES, AND THAT THE SOVIET REINFORCEMENT CAPABILITY INVALIDATES THEIR ARGUMENT. UK REP COMMENTED THAT SPEAKING OF THE TOTAL REINFORCEMENT CAPABILITIES OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE US WOULD OPEN A WIDE AREA TO THE OTHER SIDE. US REP RESPONDED THAT THE ARGUMENT WAS TAKEN FROM PREVIOUS PLENARY STATEMENTS, AND THAT IT WAS A SIGNIFICANT ARGUMENT MILITARILY. THE GREATER THE REDUCTIONS, THE MORE IMPORTANT THE RELATIVE CAPABILITIES TO REINFORCE ARE; THE SOVIETS HAVE A STRONG CAPABILITY, WHILE SO MUCH OF NATO'S IS BASED ON THE USE OF A LIMITED NUMBER OF EUROPEAN PORTS AND AIR FIELDS WHICH WOULD PROBABLY BE EARLY TARGETS DURING A WAR. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION, WHERE THE TEXT HAD READ; "IT IS ALSO NECESSARY TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE TOTAL REINFORCEMENT CAPABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES AND THAT OF THE SOVIET UNION." IT WAS CHANGED TO READ: " IT IS ALSO NECESSARY TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE EFFECT OF THE GEOGRAPHICAL FACTOR ON THE RELATIVE ABILITY OF THE US AND USSR TO INTRODUCE GROUND FORCE REINFORCEMENTS INTO THE AREA."

12. UK REP ASKED US REP ABOUT HOW HE EXPECTED THE TALKING POINTS TO BE USED. US REP RESPONDED THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO SEE HOW THE DISCUSSION WENT, BUT THAT HE INTENDED TO FOLLOW THE FORMAL PRESENTATION WITH SEVERAL OF THE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE EASTERN PROPOSALS. UK REP SUGGESTED THAT THE GROUP WOULD PROBABLY ALSO NEED A THIRD SECTION OF RUBUTTAL POINTS TO ANSWER EASTERN ARGUMENTS, PERHAPS FROM THE US REP'S PLENARY STATEMENT ON US/SOVIET GROUND FORCES.

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13. BELGIUM REP (ADRIAENSSSEN) ASKED WHY IT WAS NECESSARY TO ASK SPECIFIC QUESTIONS ABOUT THE NAMES AND COMPOSITION OF THE SOVIET TANK ARMIES, AND THE CHAIRMAN RESPONDED THAT IT MIGHT BRING THE EAST TO PUT THEIR DATA ON THE TABLE.

PROCEDURES FOR PREPARING FUTURE TALKING POINTS

14. UK REP SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO THANK THE US DEL FOR THEIR QUICK WORK IN DEVELOPING THESE TALKING POINTS. HE ADDED THAT IT WAS HIS BELIEF THAT THERE WOULD BE QUITE A NUMBER OF THESE TALKING POINT PAPERS IN THE FUTURE AND THAT PERHAPS THE AHG SHOULD HAVE THESE PAPERS WRITTEN BY ITS DRAFTING GROUP. CHAIRMAN REPLIED THAT THE DRAFTING GROUP WOULD BE OVERLOADED IF THIS WERE DONE. THE GROUP WAS SAID TO BE VERY INVOLVED IN DEVELOPING THE PLENARY STATEMENTS, AND IF NEEDED, A SECOND GROUP MIGHT HANDLE THESE TALKING POINT PAPERS.

15. PERHAPS THE DRAFTING OF THESE TALKING POINTS COULD BE DONE
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IN AN AD HOC MANNER BY THE COUNTRIES WHO ARE MOST INTERESTED. CANADIAN REP (GRANDE) SUGGESTED THAT IF THE FREQUENCY OF THE PLENARY STATEMENTS WAS REDUCED, THE WORKING GROUP WOULD HAVE MORE TIME TO WORK ON THE TALKING POINTS, BUT HE BELIEVED THAT THE INITIAL DRAFT SHOULD BE DONE BY A NATIONAL DELEGATION AND THEN TURNED OVER TO THE DRAFTING GROUP. US DEP REP REPLIED THAT IN THE FUTURE, TALKING POINT PAPERS WILL PROBABLY BE MUCH SHORTER. THE FIRST TALKING POINT PAPERS WERE LONGER SO THAT THE GROUP COULD HAVE SUFFICIENT MATERIAL TO GET THE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIETS GOING. ITALIAN DEP REP OBSERVED

THAT IN HIS OPINION, THE DRAFTING GROUP WAS NOT OVERLOADED, AND THAT AT THIS STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THE TALKING POINTS WERE REALLY MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE PLENARY STATEMENTS. THE DRAFTING GROUP WAS OPEN-ENDED AND COULD BE EXPANDED IF NECESSARY. HE FELT THAT THE FIRST READING OF A DRAFT TALKING POINT PAPER SHOULD BE HANDLED BY THE DRAFTING GROUP, NOT BY THE AHG. THE BELGIAN REP STATED THAT IN VIEW OF THE ADDITIONAL MATTERS WHICH NEED TO BE COVERED IN THIS MEETING, HE WOULD SUGGEST THAT THE AHG LEAVE THIS QUESTION OPEN AT THIS TIME, AND DEFER DISCUSSION UNTIL A LATER DATE; THE GROUP AGREED TO THIS SUGGESTION.

CANADIAN PLENARY STATEMENT

16. THE CHAIRMAN THEN TURNED TO THE DRAFT STATEMENT ON STABILIZING MEASURES THAT WAS SCHEDULED TO BE GIVEN BY THE CANADIAN REP AT THE PLENARY MEETING OF 28 FEBRUARY. UK REP FELT STRONGLY THAT SOME MENTION OF THE ASSOCIATED MEASURES SHOULD BE INSERTED IN THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF THE DRAFT STATEMENT. HE REMINDED THE GROUP THAT AT THE 21 FEBRUARY PLENARY, SOVIET REP HAD QUESTIONED THE WEST AS TO WHY STABILIZING MEASURES SHOULD BE A PART OF ASSOCIATED MEASURES. UK REP BELIEVED THAT THE ASSOCIATED MEASURES AND STABILIZING MEASURES SHOULD BOTH BE TIED TOGETHER IN THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF THE STABILIZING MEASURES STATEMENT IN REPLY TO KHLESTOV AND GROUP AGREED TO INSERT PHRASING WHICH WOULD ACCOMPLISH THIS.

17. THE FRG REP RECOMMENDED THAT A PHRASE BE DELETED WHICH JUSTIFIED STABILIZING MEASURES BECAUSE THEY MIGHT PREVENT DEVELOPMENT OF AN AMBIGUOUS SITUATION. US DEP REP NOTED THAT AMBIGUOUS SITUATIONS SHOULD STILL EXIST ASIDE FROM ACTUAL VIOLATIONS OF THE TREATY, AND THAT STABILIZING MEASURES WOULD
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HELP INSURE THAT ANY AMBIGUOUS SITUATION WAS CORRECTLY INTERPRETED. DURING A LENGTHY DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT, IT APPEARED THAT THE FRG REP'S PRIMARY CONCERN WAS THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD NOT ALLOW THE EAST TO GET THE IMPRESSION THAT IF THE EAST VIOLATED A REDUCTION AGREEMENT, THERE WOULD BE NO WESTERN RESPONSE. US REP NOTED THAT THE RESPONSES TO VIOLATIONS OF AN AGREEMENT WOULD CERTAINLY BE DISCUSSED LATER, AND THAT THERE WAS NO NEED TO DELETE THE REFERENCE TO AMBIGUOUS SITUATIONS. FOLLOWING MORE DISCUSSION, THE GROUP ACCEPTED THE ORIGINAL TEXT ON THIS POINT. AFTER SEVERAL OTHER MINOR REVISIONS, THE PLENARY STATEMENT WAS APPROVED FOR PRESENTATION. HUMES

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